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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
and that this transaction should be distinguished from the usual case of such
mortgages since the mortgagor was not the recipient of the loan.
Affirming an order for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Amherst Factors, a unanimous Court held, -2 as to the validity of the mortgage, that
the point of law was settled in 1880, in the case of Pratt v. Eaton.24 The Court
said that although the notes were void because of illegal discount, so long as
the corporation is authorized to lend money and the recital of the mortgage is
that it is given to secure the loan, the mortgage is valid. 25 Answering the defendant's assertion of a distinction from the Pratt case, the Court held that, absent a transaction designed to evade the usury laws, the facts here are controlled
by that case. Since the giving of a mortgage to secure the debt of a third party
is legal and proper, there is no more reason to compromise the position of the
lender than where the mortgagor is the recipient of the loan.
In the instant case, the Court reaffirms an established doctrine, making it
explicit that it shall be applied even where the mortgage is executed for the benefit of one other than the mortgagor.
Estoppel of Debtor from Asserting Defense
Section 18 of the Lien Law provides that a lien filed with the State Comptroller and Department of Public Works remains valid and effective only for six
months unless an action is commenced to foreclose the lien within that time or
an order is obtained from the Court extending it.
In Triple Cities Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 26 plaintiff-sulcontractor brought an action against defendant bonding company on a bond
given by the defendant pursuant to chapter 707 of the Laws of 1938 (now State
Finance Law, section 137), which guarantees prompt payment of all moneys
due to laborers and materialmen from general contractors engaged in the construction of public improvements for New York State. However, section 137
also provides that it is a condition precedent to securing any rights and benefits
under this statute that materialmen must file and enforce a mechanics lien, pursuant to the New York Lien Law. Defendant contended that plaintiff, by failing
to comply with the requirements of section 18 of the Lien Law, had allowed
its lien against the general contractor to expire and therefore was precluded
from bringing an action on the bond. The Court of Appeals held that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant, by deliberately engag23. Amherst Factors, Inc. v. Kochenburger, 4 N.Y.2d
570 (1958).
24. 79 N.Y. 449 (1880).
25. Pratt v. Eaton, supra note 24.
26. 4 N.Y.2d 443, 176 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1958).
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ing in protracted negotiations which misled and lulled the plaintiff into inactivity, was estopped from asserting plaintiff's nonenforcement of its lien as a de27
fense.
Sufficiency of Bankruptcy Proceedings

-

Per Curiam

Execution pursuant to a 1931 judgment was properly vacated both because
the permission of court required by srction 651 of the Civil Practice Act2 8 was
not obtained and because the judgment debtor had been discharged in bankruptcy. Since the judgment was properly listed in the bankruptcy proceedings,
although the addresses of the judgment creditors were listed as unknown, the
burden was upon the judgment creditors to "show that the bankrupt knew or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known their addresses ...
29
at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings."
CRIMINAL LAW
Reindicfment After Reversal of Conviction Not Double Jeopardy
In People v. Ercolel an appeal from a conviction for larceny had been
reversed and the indictment dismissed because it had been improperly amended.2
The defendant was reindicted and thereafter moved for a dismissal on the ground
that he was being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. The motion
was granted, and affirmed by the Appellate Division.a The Court of Appeals
unanimously reversed, holding that a defendant who procures a reversal of a
conviction for legal error at his trial cannot plead the former conviction in bar
to a second trial for the same offense.
The defendant relied on a number of cases, all of which were based on the
unlawful termination of the trial without the consent of the accused. 4 New York
has long held, in double jeopardy cases, that the essence of a successful appeal on
27. An estoppel "rests upon the word .or deed of one party upon which

another rightfully relies, and so relying changes his position to his injury".
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 230 N.Y. 285, 292, 130 N.E. 295, 298
(1921).
28. Levine v. Bornstein, 4 N.Y.2d 241, 173 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1958).
29. Shire v. Bornstein, 4 N.Y.2d 299, 174 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1958).
1. People v. Ercole, 4 N.Y.2d 617, 176 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1958).
2. 308 N.Y. 425, 126 N.E.2d 543 (1955).
3. People v. Ercole, 4 A.D.2d 881, 167 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d Dep't 1957).
4. People ex rel. Stabile v. Warden, 202 N.Y. 138, 95 N.E. 729 (1911)
(Judge arbitrarily dismissed a jury that had not reached a verdict); People
ex rel. Blue v. Kearney, 292 N.Y. 679, 56 N.E.2d 102 (1944) (During trial for
manslaughter the judge discharged the jury. He felt that under N.Y. Code Cr.
Proc. §400 defendant should be reindicted for murder in the second or first
degree).

